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PRIVACY AND DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING
DAVID P. BALLARD*
INTRODUCTION
T HE individual's right to privacy in the computer age has become a
matter of increasing concern in the United States.' Mailing lists,
a form of data file subject to the effects of increased computer
capabilities, have been included in the inquiry into the privacy impli-
cations of computer technology. 2 This Article will examine the prob-
lems of privacy as they relate to direct mail advertising-the sending of
advertisements to persons on mailing lists to promote the purchase of
goods or services by mail directly from the advertiser.
The privacy issues in the computer age center around the capability
of the individual to control how information about him is used 3 in light
of the capability of computers to store and manipulate information.
4
Such privacy issues include three specific concerns. The first is the
accuracy of the information on file and the individual's ability to
correct misinformation. When an individual is subject to inaccurate
and unverified information in a data file he may be the victim of unjust
decisions5 concerning such important matters as whether to grant
* Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1972, Harvard College; M.B.A. 1975, Harvard
Business School; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School.
1. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522a (1976); U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and
Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW
Report]; Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Privacy Commission Report]; A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy. Computers,
Data Banks, and Dossiers (1971) [hereinafter cited as Assault on Privacy); A. Westin, Privacy and
Freedom (1967); A. Westin & M. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society (1972); Countryman, The
Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 837
(1971); Hersbergen, Regulating Commercial Exploitation of Name Lists and Direct Mail Solicita-
tion Under The Fair Credit Reporting Act-A Victory for Consumer Privacy?, I Ohio N. L. Rev.
1 (1973); Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an
Information-Oriented Society, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1089 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Information-
Oriented Society]; Seller, Right of Privacy and Direct Response Solicitation, 12 Forum 782
(1977); Note, Commercial Information Brokers, 4 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 203 (1972).
2. See HEW Report, supra note 1, app. H, at 288-97; Assault on Privacy, supra note 1, at
79-82. See generally Hersbergen, supra note 1; Seiler, supra note 1. For a description of the
computer's impact on one major direct mail list compiler, see A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note
1, at 154-67.
3. See, e.g., Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 482 (1968); Information-Oriented Society,
supra note 1, at 1107-09. "[Wlhen the individual is deprived of control over the information
spigot, he in some measure becomes subservient to those people and institutions that are able to
gain access to it." Id. at 1108.
4. A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 1, at 4 (modem computer technology may greatly
"increase the amount of information collected, consolidated, and exchanged about individuals");
see HEW Report, supra note 1, at 28-29.
5. Speaking in favor of the Privacy Act of 1974, Senator Percy outlined the problems of
verifying data bank information: "[T]he individual is not the depositor, not the beneficiary, and
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credit or offer employment. 6 A second concern is that such data will be
used for improper purposes, for example, to blackmail for political
reasons. 7 A final concern is that because of the computer's ability to
collate increased amounts of personal data rapidly, the data itself will
begin to take on a new dossier-like character. 8
At the direction of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Privacy Protection
Study Commission has recently recognized the importance of the
privacy issues relating to direct mail advertising. 9 Some of the Com-
mission's recommendations, however, are disappointing in that they do
not take into account certain economic and societal effects of direct
mail advertising. To ignore such considerations may lead to dysfunc-
tional law and policy attacking the wrong problems at an unnecessarily
high societal cost.' 0 In light of these problems, this Article will suggest
a framework of analysis that is designed to accommodate the compet-
ing interests at work in this unique area of privacy law.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING
A. The Direct Mail Industry
Direct mail" forms an important part of the direct response sales
industry, which accounts for a large portion of retail sales in the
not the guardian of personal information stored in a data bank. He is given little or no
opportunity to see the information kept on him, and only rarely can he challenge the accuracy of
that information. And yet this same information is used by all manner of organizations to make
important decisions that may personally affect him." 120 Cong. Rec. 36894 (1974).
6. Countryman, supra note 1, at 844.
7. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 19. Professor Countryman has labeled these data gatherers
the "punitive compilers". Countryman, supra note 1, at 846.
8. The Executive Director of the Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy noted
when speaking in the context of criminal records: "We have public record information
dispersed in courthouses, police courts, and judicial offices around the country. But when we can
accumulate this information into a criminal history file, maintained by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, this no longer can be considered the same type of information as it was out In the
courthouses, it has changed its character, . . . it has transformed the nature and the quality of
this information so that there can be [a] dossier compiled . . . whereas before if you wanted to
find out about an individual you had to go to a lot of expense to go around the country to compile
information." Address by Douglas Metz, Executive Director of the Domestic Council Commit-
tee on the Right of Privacy, Associated Third Class Mail Users Annual Membership Dinner
(Sept. 30, 1974). In a similar light the HEW Report remarked that even when small details are
compiled into a dossier, the data subject "can never know when some piece of trivia will close a
noose of circumstantial evidence around him." HEW Report, supra note 1, at 21.
9. See Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 125-54.
10. Arguing for the need to look at data systems as they in fact operate, Westin and Baker
state: "[Pleople must understand that most of the information-analysis capabilities computers
make possible are not present in the hardware when it is delivered. Such capabilities must be
chosen deliberately by users of computers and put in as the files are designed, programming
instructions are set, and other ad hoc system efforts go forward. . . . What managements are
doing with computers is therefore a question of empirical fact, not a general computer capability
which one may assume without evidence that particular organizations have brought into being
and are now using." A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 1, at 279.
11. The term "direct mail" may be defined as the mailing of advertising solicitations directly
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United States. Although there is considerable disagreement as to the
exact size of the direct response industry, estimates range from $14
billion12 to $50 billion1 3 worth of goods and services sold annually.
The amount spent on advertising by direct response advertisers is
estimated to be between $2 and $3 billion per year.' 4 These advertising
expenditures are made in a variety of media, including magazines,
newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and direct mail, all of
which initiate direct-to-consumer sales' s by the advertisers:
The success of any direct mail advertising program depends on
which of the approximately 25,000 lists in existence' 6 is used. 17 Mail-
ing lists may be divided into three types depending upon their imme-
diate source of names. 18 The internal or "house" list is the advertiser's
own list of customers. For example, a retailer's house list might include
current charge account customers, while a mail order company's list
might include recent purchasers. The second type of list is the direct
response list, which includes names of people who have answered a
direct response offer of another advertiser. The third type of list is the
compiled list, which includes names obtained from automobile regis-
trations, birth certificates, and other public sources.' 9
The primary objective in selecting a list to rent is matching the
characteristics of the anticipated consumer of the advertised product
with the characteristics of a given list.20 Advertisers typically consider
the source of a list's names2' or a survey of its members. A survey
usually involves statistically sampling list members to determine their
purchasing habits and other demographic information.22 For example,
a magazine publisher might want to know subscribers' ages, educa-
tional levels, and readership of other magazines. It should be noted,
however, that advertisers cannot tell anything about any specific
to consumers. The term may encompass two situations: the mail order firm that sells only by mail
and has no retail stores and the retail store that sells by mail.
12. Direct Marketing, Dec. 1974, at 60. The report indicates that this represents about 12%
of all merchandise sold. Id.
13. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 289. This is reported to represent about 5% of the gross
national product of the United States. Id.
14. Id.
15. Direct Marketing, Dec. 1974, at 60.
16. A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 1, at 30.
17. B. Stone, Successful Direct Marketing Methods 3 (1975).
18. Id. at 58; Harper, Changing Patterns of Lists and How They Affect Markets, Direct
Marketing, Apr. 1975, at 22, 24.
19. For a discussion of R-L. Polk & Co., a compiler of lists from public information sources,
see A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 1, at 156-67.
20. B. Stone, supra note 17, at 42.
21. For instance, one mailing list catalog classifies lists by source of names, such as responses
to magazine ads for specified products. See Standard Rate and Data Service, Direct Mail List
Rates and Data (1973).
22. For examples containing results of subscriber and reader surveys, see Advertising Age,
Jan. 22, 1979, at 9, 17, 19, 21, 31.
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individual on the list through a survey since the only survey results
they receive are aggregates of the individual data. Moreover, the direct
mail advertiser is not concerned with the attributes of any single list
member, but looks for group characteristics indicating that a sufficient
number of the list members are likely to purchase the advertiser's
product.
Direct mail advertising lends itself to statistical testing techniques
that can help an advertiser select lists whose members will be respon-
sive, and avoid the expense of extensive mailings to unresponsive
consumers. 23 Through more advanced statistical techniques individual
lists can be divided into segments, the most promising of which can be
selected for the mailing.24 Mailing costs also can be reduced by
periodic editing of the mailing lists to delete names of those who have
not been active buyers. 25
B. Advantages of Direct Mail as an Advertising Medium
Direct mail entails certain important economic advantages that are
especially important to advertisers. First, the ability to pretest the
potential responsiveness of a mailing enables an advertiser to limit the
risk of an unprofitable mailing. Second, a small advertiser can rent
only a portion of a list from another direct mail advertiser, thereby
minimizing the investment required. Third, an advertiser might be
able to target precisely those groups of people whose past mail order
activity indicates an interest in its product.
Direct mail also has qualitative advantages. For instance, in com-
parison with newspapers, direct mail has less "clutter" to distract the
customer from the advertisement. In addition, direct mail advertise-
ments can present longer and more informative messages to the
23. B. Stone, supra note 17, at 42.
24. Id. at 51-53. One technique uses factor analysis to compare the demographic census data
for different zip codes and then, on the basis of the results from mailing to a sample of zip codes,
selects those additional zip codes most likely to generate a favorable response to the mailed
advertisement. Hicks, How Lifestyle Segmentation Selets Prospects from ZIPs, Direct Market-
ing, March 1975, at 40. In effect, this technique selects the most favorable zip codes for a given
list, in a manner similar to the techniques used to forecast election returns from sample precincts
on election night.
A second statistical technique compares the extent to which different lists result In similar
response patterns for several products. Then, using such statistical techniques as factor analysis,
predictions are made of the products for which specific lists would be effective. The technique
would also enable a mailer to make a prediction of another list's performance based on the actual
performance of previous lists. As with zip code segmentation, the comparison of lists is directed to
the characteristics of the group as a whole, rather than individual members of the lists, Harper,
Posgay & Tyszler, Selection of Mailing Lists by Multivariate Analysis, Direct Marketing, Feb.
1975, at 34.
25. Direct mail marketers look at three criteria in evaluating the profit potential for members
of their house lists: how recently and with what frequency they purchase and the amount of
money spent. See Harper, Posgay & Tyszler, supra note 24, at 22.
[Vol. 4 7498
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consumer. This increased ability to inform the consumer about the
product is significant because a consumer is generally unable to inspect
the advertised product before responding to the offer.
The immediate resulting sales are not the only source of income for
the direct mail advertiser; many mail order marketers look to continu-
ing sales to satisfied customers to achieve a reasonable return.2 6
Additionally, a mail order firm often can generate additional revenue
by renting the list of respondents to other direct mail advertisers.
Indeed, for some mail order companies the fees for the rental of their
lists provide the profit margin for the entire mail order operation.2 7
Mail order firms have different policies on renting their lists to other
mail order marketers. One industry commentator reports that most list
owners will rent out their lists to reputable noncompetitors,2 8 but this
policy is not universal. 29 Those list owners that do rent their lists for
important business reasons maintain close control over the use of such
lists. "[N]o direct marketer wants to offend his own customers or risk
losing them to a competitor by renting his list to just anyone. ' 30 In
order to protect against misuse of their lists, most firms require that
they approve the proposed mailing.31 In addition, decoy names are
added to the list to monitor the mailings made and to trace any
mailings by unauthorized persons. 32
C. The Societal Impact of Direct Mail
Because the initial advertising commitment required is low and
there is no necessity to establish retail distribution channels, the cost of
entering mail order marketing is relatively low. One study has indi-
cated that some sixty percent of small mail order firms were able to
start their business with an investment of under $5,000.33 Indeed, the
industry as a whole seems to be dominated numerically by small
organizations. One industry source has indicated that two-thirds of the
mail order firms have sales under $500,000.34
26. Harper, supra note 18, at 24, 26.
27. Id. at 24.
28. B. Stone, supra note 17, at 44.
29. Fitzgerald, Book Club Business Booming Following Return to Afails, Direct Marketing,
Jan. 1975, at 26.
30. Harper, supra note 18, at 24.
31. Id.
32. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 294. If a firm adds decoy names, for example those of the
firm's executives, and those executives receive unauthorized mailings, the firm is made aware that
its list is being abused by its lessee. In addition, some firms rent only through an intermediary
that "addresses the mail but does not give the advertiser a copy of the list." A. Westin & M. Baker,
supra note 1, at 155.
33. Griffin, Mail Order Retailing-Economic Considerations for Small Operators, Small
Business Administration Report Project 119 (1963).
34. Merchandising Week, Oct. 16, 1972, at 6, col. 3. The HEW Report stated that of all third
1979]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The economic importance of mail order firms extends beyond what
would be indicated by their size. In effect, a small local retailer can
become a "seminational corporation" competing over a much broader
area via mail order than it could have through a store alone." One
result of this access to wider markets is the greater responsiveness of
merchandisers to consumer desires and needs. 36 In addition, direct
mail marketing provides other important benefits for the consumer.
For instance, a consumer living in an area having few stores can
purchase a wider variety of items via mail. Similarly, direct mail
marketing can be an important service to "shut-ins" who are unable to
use normal retail outlets. 3 7
Direct mail also plays a critical role in the dissemination of thought
and opinion to American society through the sales of books and
magazines. The single largest portion of mailings is magazine subscrip-
tion offers, accounting for nearly ten percent of all direct mail. 38 Direct
mail is the crucial means for many magazines to obtain subscriptions:
seventy percent of all subscriptions are sold by direct mail. 39 Direct
mail is a particularly important factor in the promotion of subscrip-
tions to new publications. For example, during its first year and a half
of existence, the National Observer obtained eighty-five percent of its
subscriptions through direct mail solicitation. 40
Direct mail has also had a significant impact on charitable and
political fundraising, collecting substantial sums of money from large
numbers of people offering support in small amounts. Direct mail
accounts for approximately eighty percent of all contributions to
nonprofit public interest organizations .4  Senator McGovern reportedly
raised approximately $4 million during his 1972 Presidential campaign
via direct mail appeals; 42 the Republican direct mail effort in the same
class mail permit holders, the majority of which are mail order firms, only a tenth had more than
one hundred employees, with half having fewer than ten. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 289.
35. See Merchandising Week, June 12, 1972, at 3, col. 3.
36. One industry publication has reported that increased mail order competition has forced
local retailers of stereo components to lower prices or improve services. Merchandising Week,
Aug. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
37. In addition to invalids, people working long hours would seem to benefit from being able
to shop at home during their free time via mail order. Direct Marketing, Dec. 1974, at 60.
38. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 289.
39. Direct Marketing, Dec. :974, at 60. Mail order accounts for some $700 million of
magazine subscriptions and $550 million of book sales. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1,
at 148.
40. R. Mockler, Circulation Planning and Development for the National Observer 29 (Oct.
1967) (unpublished research paper, Georgia State College). In the following year, after a
substantial effort to diversify its circulation sources, nearly half of the subscriptions still came
from direct mail. Id. at 35.
41. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 134.
42. Collins, McGovern Mailings Emphasize Issues, Motivation, Needs, Direct Marketing,
Nov. 1972, at 39.
[Vol. 4 7
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campaign raised about $8 million in average contributions of about $22
each. 43 Similar success with direct mail fundraising has been reported
for public television.44
II. THE PRIVACY ISSUES RAISED BY DIRECT MAIL
One major privacy concern presented by direct mail lists is the
possibility of merging and comparing different lists to compile dossier-
type data on an individual. 45 In practice, however, there would seem
to be little business motivation to develop data on specific individuals,
since direct mail advertisers are primarily concerned with the response
performance of entire mailing lists. 46 A typical mailing elicits responses
from only three or four percent of those persons receiving the mail;47 to
make wide-ranging file investigations of every list member would
involve the expense of investigating one hundred percent of the list in
order to find four percent who would both qualify for and respond to
the mailing. In other words, the advertiser would be wasting about
ninety-six percent of his investigatory efforts on people who would not
respond to his offer.
Direct mail marketers might be interested in compiling detailed data
on individual customers' direct response purchasing histories. Such
43. Weintz, Republicans Find Lists, Testing, Copy, Key to Successful M1ailings, Direct
Marketing, Nov. 1972, at 39. The Privacy Commission Report has noted the critical importance
of direct mail political fund raising under the new federal election laws. Privacy Commission
Report, supra note 1, at 147.
44. Hicks, WNET TV Raises Funds by Direct Mail and Telecasts, Direct Marketing, Feb.
1975, at 32. Since lawyers have been given the right to advertise, even they have taken advantage
of direct mail advertising. See N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
45. "Because the new technology makes it possible to integrate personal information from a
variety of sources, solicitation lists increasingly will become the product of wide-ranging file
investigations into the background and finances of prospective customers." Assault on Privacy,
supra note 1, at 80. Miller quotes a computer-written letter received by an acquaintance soliciting
his participation in a commercial venture. The letter lists four items of information about the
addressee: his ownership of his home; his automobile ownership; his income "in the critical
$12,500 to $19,500 range"; and his "few hundred dollars . . . in the bank." Miller has
misapprehensions about the information contained in the "computer letter". Id. at 80-81.
Although the home ownership and automobile data would be unique for the addressee, probably
compiled from publicly available lists of home buyers and motor vehicle registration, the financial
data mentioned in the letter would be less so. The income range would encompass a major
portion of the middle class, and would be even more inclusive on an individual neighborhood
basis. At the same time the "few hundred dollars in the bank" would not seem to be very
informative or descriptive, both for reasons of vagueness and the likelihood that most people in
the income range hypothesized could be expected to have a "few hundred dollars" saved. Miller's
analysis of the letter, therefore, overestimates the prying into the addressee's background: -The
letter's content makes it clear that the writer pursued a number of sources to determine the
[addressees'] status as home owners and a two-car family, as well as their bank
balance and income range." Id. at 81.
46. Because the response rate is so small, a small change in the response rate could have
a relatively large economic effect on the mailer. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 295.
47. Id.
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information, as maintained by a single mail order firm, hardly creates
an invasion of privacy, since the compiled purchase history would be
produced by the retailer from information necessarily and voluntarily
supplied by the individual. However, sale or rental of a mailing list
containing consumer purchasing histories as its attribute might consti-
tute an unwarranted breach of confidentiality.
In addition to the concern about the ability of direct mailers to
compile dossiers on their prospective customers, there is a belief that
names and addresses which are supplied by citizens under compulsion
for government registrations should not form the basis of commercial
mailings.4 8 In part, this concern arises from a belief that the data
disclosed under compulsion in many registration procedures is not
intended for direct mail advertising.49
Direct mail does not raise all of the privacy issues raised by other
data systems. In particular, direct mail does not raise accuracy con-
cerns, because the data contained in a mailing list is largely names and
addresses which are easily distinguished from more sensitive data such
as that gathered by credit bureaus.50 Nevertheless, the question of the
relative rights of the individual list member and the direct mail
advertiser regarding privacy remains. It is instructive, therefore, to
examine the courts' response to such questions and the applicability of
the common law right of privacy to direct mail practices.
I. COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND DIRECT MAIL
A. Theoretical Basis
In what has been labeled the "gospel article",51 Warren and Bran-
deis introduced a right of privacy imprecisely defined by Judge Cooley
as "the right 'to be let alone."' 5 2 Perhaps the most influential chronicler
of the right of privacy since Warren and Brandeis has been Dean
Prosser S3 who has provided the analytical basis of privacy for a
number of courts5 4 as well as the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement).5
48. See notes 126, 128 infra and accompanying text.
49. A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 1, at 385-86.
50. Id. at 24. The mere sending of unsolicited mail, however, is often seen as an Invasion of
the privacy of the recipient. See HEW Report, supra note 1, at 290. This claim is usually
dismissed, however, with the argument that mail is more of an "annoyance" than an "invasion."
See id. at 71.
51. York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 499,
534 (1957).
52. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890).
53. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
54. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.
1974); Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 537, 250 A.2d 878, 882 (1969).
55. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652J (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
[Vol. 4 7
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Prosser defines four separate interests within the right of privacy.56
Intrusion covers acts such as wiretapping and prying into bank ac-
counts, and is intended to protect an individual from mental distress.
Public disclosure of embarrassing facts deals with the publication of
personal information by the mass media when there is no overriding
public interest in having those facts revealed. The false light branch of
Prosser's analysis involves falsely attributing to a person criminality or
political stands, for example, by publishing his picture as part of a
rogue's gallery or falsely including his name on a political petition.
Both public disclosure and false light are designed to protect the
individual's mental peace and reputation. Finally, appropriation cov-
ers the use of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes, as
in endorsing a commercial product. Here the interest is presumably
pecuniary; in essence appropriation creates an exclusive license for
the use of an individual's name.5 7
Professor Bloustein, on the other hand, rejects Prosser's
classifications virtually point-by-point, s8 and concludes that privacy
really protects the general interest of human dignity. 9 Bloustein and
Prosser establish two important branches of legal thought underlying
the law of privacy. The line of thought represented by Bloustein bases
the right of privacy on incorporeal grounds, while Prosser purports to
have discovered a number of interests that have evolved under the
right of privacy. Although Prosser has been followed by a number of
courts, 60 the Bloustein analysis remains an important development in
the law of privacy.61 Thus, it is important to consider both analyses
when analyzing privacy and direct mail advertising.
B. Mailing List Cases
Mailing list cases can be divided into three basic groups. The first
group arises with the release of names from state-compiled files such as
state motor vehicle registrations. The second group includes cases
involving the release of federally compiled information, often pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).62 The final group involves
privately compiled lists. 63
Restatement Draft]; Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 964 n.11 (1964).
56. Prosser, supra note 53, at 389.
57. Id. at 389-407.
58. Bloustein, supra note 55, at 966-1000.
59. "The injury is to our individuality, to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy
represents a social vindication of the human spirit thus threatened rather than a recompense for
the loss suffered." Id. at 1003.
60. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
61. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 326, 328 (1966).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
63. A related group of cases addresses the obligation of corporations facing a unionization
1979]
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Taken together, these cases are important as an indication of
judicial thinking concerning the issues of privacy and direct mail. It
must be kept in mind, however, that among the different groups of
cases somewhat different privacy interests are at stake. For instance,
although the right of privacy is the central interest asserted in the cases
involving privately compiled lists, it is but one of several competing
interests arising in the FOIA cases. Hence, in evaluating the mailing
list cases, it is important to consider the context in which the privacy
questions are raised.
1. State-Compiled Lists
The court in Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles 64 consid-
ered both constitutional and common law privacy issues. The suit was
one to enjoin New York's Motor Vehicle Commissioner from selling
registration records under a competitive bidding system. Plaintiffs
claimed that a constitutional and common law invasion of privacy
arose from the leasing of the list of names to direct mail advertisers. As
a result, plaintiffs claimed that they and other registrants were sub-
jected to "considerable annoyance, inconvenience and damage . . . by
reason of the large volume of advertising and crank mail and other
solicitation" they received. 65 In granting defendants' motion to dismiss,
the court stated:
The mail box, however noxious its advertising contents often seem to judges as well as
other people, is hardly the kind of enclave that requires constitutional defense to
protect 'the privacies of life.' The short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash
can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned
6 6
election to provide union representatives a list of the employees eligible to vote. In these cases the
employers argued that to disclose the lists would invade their employees' privacy. See NLRB v.
Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969); NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 368,
373 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd, 405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1968). The courts, however, did not find the
disclosure sufficiently violative of the employees' privacy rights to block the release of the lists.
The court in British Auto Parts, for instance, noted that the employees were free to turn away
the union organizers. Id. at 373. Similarly, the court in Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc. found
the potential for unwanted intrusion outweighed by the public interest in having an informed
electorate for union election. 274 F. Supp. at 438.
64. 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
915 (1968).
65. Id. at 882.
66. Id. at 883; accord, Chapin v. Tynan, 158 Conn. 625, 264 A.2d 566 (1969). On the other
hand, in Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the Court found that "a
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee," Id. at
736-37. In Rowan, however, the Court dealt with the right of households to prevent pornography
from being sent to their homes. The subject matter of the mailings clearly had potential for
causing greater offense than would be the case with the typical direct mail advertisement. In
addition, Rowan involved a statute that enabled the addressees to notify the Post Office that the
specified pornography was not wanted. Id. at 731-35.
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The court further noted that the information sold by the state was in
the "category of 'public records', available to anyone upon demand. '67
The Lamont court enunciated three principles regarding direct mail
and privacy. First, direct mail advertising does not violate the Con-
stitution with regard to privacy. Second, following the Prosser analy-
sis, there is no violation of common law privacy based on the intrusion
portion of the tort; the court found the "journey to the trash can" an
acceptable social burden. Third, also following the Prosser analysis,
there is no "public disclosure of private facts" invasion since the court
found the names to be public information. 68
2. Federally Compiled Lists
This second group of cases deals with attempts to use the FOIA to
obtain federally compiled lists. In Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS,69 a
distributor of winemaking supplies sued the Internal Revenue Service
to obtain a list of those households registered to produce wine for
family use. The government argued that the disclosure of the names
would violate exemption 6 of the FOIA, 70 which allows the govern-
ment to prohibit disclosure of files when disclosures would "constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 71 The court held
that the term "unwarranted" required a balancing of the interests of
privacy against the purpose asserted for the release. 72 Finding that the
release of the names and addresses constituted an invasion of pri-
vacy, 73 the court determined that the commercial purpose of the
disclosure did not outweigh such an invasion. 74
Getman v. NLRB, 75 which the court in Wine Hobby relied upon,
considered the need for balancing public and private interests under
67. 269 F. Supp. at 883.
68. Id.
69. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)(1976).
71. Id.
72. 502 F.2d at 136.
73. "One consequence of this disclosure is that a registrant will be subject to unsolicited and
possibly unwanted mail from Wine Hobby and perhaps offensive mail from others. Moreover,
information concerning personal activities within the home, namely wine-making, is revealed by
disclosure. Similarly, disclosure reveals information concerning the family status of the registrant,
including the fact that he is not living alone and that he exercises family control or responsibility
in the household. Disclosure of these facts concerning the home and private activities within it
constitutes an 'invasion of personal privacy.' "Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the court noted
that the availability of unlisted telephone numbers and rental of post office boxes recognizes.a
privacy interest in one's mail box and telephone. Id. at 137 n.15.
74. Because Wine Hobby's sole justification for disclosure was private commercial exploita-
tion with no direct or indirect public interest, the court concluded that the invasion, which it did
not consider serious, would nevertheless be "clearly unwarranted." Id. at 137.
75. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
exemption 6 of the FOIA. 76 Certain law professors sued the National
Labor Relations Board to obtain a list of eligible union voters in order
to study attitudes toward union election processes and campaign
tactics. The court noted that any invasion of privacy would be minor
and that the public interest in having the results of the proposed study
outweighed any possible invasion. 77 The court also noted that the
potential for disclosure would be limited because use of the list would
be confined to the law professors. 78
It should be noted that the courts' appraisal of the right of privacy in
these FOIA cases is not based on a traditional common law notion of
privacy. These cases do not look for an invasion of privacy that would
be actionable on its own, but instead compare the possible claim of
invasion of privacy with the asserted benefits of the disclosure under
the FOIA. In this context, access to the lists would be denied if a de
minimis invasion of privacy were present and no public interest were
asserted for the disclosure. These cases, therefore, have only a limited
applicability to common law privacy actions, since privacy claims
asserted in the FOIA cases might not be sufficient to support a cause of
action in tort.
Although it can be argued that the FOIA cases do not strictly apply
to common law privacy actions, they do indicate some judicial at-
titudes toward direct mail and privacy that differ from those in
Lamont. In particular, while the Lamont court recognized neither an
invasion of the intrusion interest nor an actionable disclosure of private
information, the FOIA cases purported to find both. The Wine Hobby
court, for instance, viewed society as recognizing an individual's right
to keep his address private by the rental of a post office box.79 Direct
mail, then, was perceived as an unnecessary intrusion into the privacy
he would otherwise be able to attain. Similarly, the release of the list of
winemakers was seen as being a disclosure of private information.
Although this disclosure might be distinguishable from that of auto-
76. Id. at 674; see Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v.
NLRB, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527 (1972).
77. "Both the House and Senate reports ... indicate that the real thrust of Exemption (6) Is
to guard against unnecessary disclosure of files of such agencies as the Veterans Administration or
the Welfare Department ... , which would contain 'intimate details' of a 'highly personal' nature,
The giving of names and addresses is a very much lower degree of disclosure; in themselves a
bare name and address give no information about an individual which is embarrassing." 450 F.2d
at 675 (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 676. Another case arising under the FO[A is Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326
(D.D.C. 1974), decision deferred, 517 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The plaintiff, a representative
of air travelers in a separate action, sought to obtain names and addresses appearing on customs
declarations of air travelers entering the United States from points in the Pacific over a period of
eighteen months. The court found that release of the names and addresses would constitute a
substantial invasion of privacy. Id. at 332.
79. 502 F.2d at 137 n.15.
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mobile registrations in that the latter is publicly accessible for purposes
such as accident litigation, the Wine Hobby case still presents judicial
reasoning that is wary of disclosure of information compiled by the
government.
It is noteworthy that the Wine Hobby court placed a low priority on
the use of lists for commercial purposes. The court, however, may have
overlooked several benefits of the mailing. The recipients of the
proposed mailing by Wine Hobby could have found the advertised
products useful and perhaps cheaper than those offered by the local
retailer. Hence, instead of finding the purported intrusion offensive,
the recipients could have found it helpful. Similarly questionable is the
court's statement that Wine Hobby would not be harmed by denying it
use of the lists.80 According to the court, the lists represented some
forty to sixty thousand registrants."' Although Wine Hobby coilld
reach most of these people through an extensive advertising campaign,
the use of general advertising media to reach such a closely defined
group of people might cost much more than a direct mail program.
3. Privately Compiled Lists
Shibley v. Time, Inc .8 2 considered the right of privacy as it relates to
members of privately compiled lists. Shibley, a Cleveland attorney,
brought a class action against American Express Co., Time, Inc., and
several other magazine publishers alleging an invasion of privacy as a
result of the defendants' rental of mailing lists that contained the
plaintiffs' names.83 The trial court dismissed the action on both
procedural and substantive grounds. The court found deficiencies in
the class action, observing that while some members of the class might
be offended by the rental of their names as part of the lists and the
subsequent receipt of mail, other members would appreciate receiving
the solicitations, thus precluding a finding that the class had a
sufficient identity of interest. 84 The court also found no actionable
invasion of privacy. 85 The court noted that local statutes permitted the
sale of lists of motor vehicle registrants, 86 thereby indicating that the
80. Id. at 137 n.17.
81. Id. at 134.
82. 40 Ohio Misc. 51, 321 N.E.2d 791 (C.P. 1974), aff'd, 45 Ohio App. 2d 69, 341 N.E.2d
337 (1975).
83. An intervenor joined the suit seeking to have the defendants offer to their list members
the ability to remove their names from the lists prior to rental or sale, while at the same time
promoting the distribution of the names of those list members wishing to be included on a number
of direct mail offerings. The court treated the intervenor's claim with the plaintiff's claim. Id. at
52-53, 321 N.E.2d at 793.
84. Id. at 60, 321 N.E.2d at 797.
85. Id. at 57, 321 N.E.2d at 795.
86. Id. at 55, 321 N.E.2d at 795.
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legislature had approved the sale of lists and apparently condoned any
invasion of privacy that might result.37
Having found no invasion of privacy, the court rejected plaintiffs'
claim that defendants were unjustly enriched by the rental of lists since
there was no actionable tort to make the enrichment unjust. 8 On
appeal, plaintiffs renewed this argument claiming that their "personal-
ity profiles" had been exploited as a result of the list rentals and that
the defendants had been unjustly enriched by the disclosure.8 9 The
court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument by limiting the
actionability of such exploitation to instances of endorsement. 90
C. Direct Mail Advertising Issues in a Prosser Framework
Although Shibley casts doubt on the actionability of a privacy claim
against direct mail list rentals, the readiness of the Wine Hobby court
to find a privacy invasion in a somewhat different context indicates
some judicial hostility toward direct mail. In an attempt to resolve this
conflict, the pri('acy issues raised by direct mail advertising will be
considered under a Prosser analysis.91
1. Intrusion
The intrusion cause of action requires an act that intrudes into the
private affairs of another and that is offensive to a reasonable man. 92
With direct mail advertisements sent to homes, the key element of the
tort would seem to be offensiveness, since it seems clear that the home
is a private place and that receipt of mail represents some sort of
intrusion. Whether a defendant's actions are offensive to a reasonable
man is normally a question of fact which turns on such issues as the
content and the manner of communication. 93 The manner in which
87. Id. One commentator argues that the Shibley court "should have more carefully examined
several corollaries of the appropriation argument presented by the appellants." Comment,
Subscription List Sales and the Elusive Right of Privacy, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 591, 602 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as List Sales]. Without offering any s;ubstantive analysis of the appropriation
action, the commentator suggests that the defendants s;hould have been required to obtain the
consent of an individual before placing his name on a rented list. Id. at 612. Such a requirement
would be of doubtful constitutionality. See pt. V infia.
88. 40 Ohio Misc. at 57, 321 N.E.2d at 795.
89. 45 Ohio App. 2d at 71, 341 N.E.2d at 339. Appellants argued that the buyers of the list
could draw certain conclusions about the financial position, social habits, and general personality
of the persons on the lists by virtue of the fact that they subscribe to certain publications. Id.
90. Id. at 72, 341 N.E.2d at 339; see W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117,
at 807-09 (4th ed. 1971).
91. The false light cause of action is not applicable and is therefore omitted.
92. Restatement Draft, supra note 55, § 652B, Comments b, c, d.
93. In McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 307 N.E.2d 34 (1973), a doctor sent notices
regarding a patient's need for a check-up for over a year after the patient's death. The surviving
husband and children sued the doctor for invasion of privacy. Finding that the doctqr's conduct
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creditors attempt to collect debts was found to be offensive when there
was "a pattern of harrassment on the part of the creditor, or the
communication, if not of such frequency as to constitute harrassment,
has been of such a nature as to possess a vicious quality."94 Other
cases have found creditors' actions to be tortious when telephone calls
were made at inconvenient times. 95
Direct mail is less susceptible to a charge of intrusion than a
solicitous telephone call.9 6 One can easily dispose of unwanted mail,
but the ringing telephone pervasively interrupts a person's living
habits. In addition, given many persons' aversion to discourtesy,
a greater mental effort is required to dispose of unwanted calls. On the
other hand, a direct mail advertising campaign that is both persistent
and offensive in terms of content might be found tortious. Hence,
although the intrusion cause of action ordinarily would not create
liability for a direct mail advertiser, it could be applied to one using
particularly objectionable methods.
2. Public Disclosure
The public disclosure cause of action consists of three elements:97 the
facts must be of a private nature, 98 there must be publicity of the facts
disclosed, 99 and "the matter made public must be one which would be
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sen-
caused mental suffering, the court overturned a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Id at
78, 307 N.E.2d at 38.
94. Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 541, 250 A.2d 878, 884 (1969).
95. See Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co., 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 716, 223 A.2d 405 (1966); Housh v.
Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
96. See Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 23; Restatement Draft, supra note 55,
§ 652B, Illustration 5. The increased use of telephone solicitation, often accomplished through the
automatic, random dialing of recorded messages, also creates privacy problems. See, e.g., N.Y
Times, March 12, 1978, at 45, col. 2; Vall St. J., March 16, 1978, at 7, col. 3. In response, the
Federal Communication Commission has instituted hearings, id., and legislation has been
introduced in Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 9505, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 10876 (1977).
Although both telephone solicitation and direct mail advertising involve communication directly
to consumers, the privacy issues involved are vastly different. First, telephone solicitation is
much more intrusive than direct mail. "You can tell most junk mall by its cover and chuck it if
you choose. But junk calls bring you on the run from your garden, interrupt your concentration
while trying to juggle the household accounts, or fall smack in the middle of the family dinner
hour." N.Y. Times, March 12, 1978, at 45, col. 3 (quoting Rep. Aspin). The disruptive nature of
telephone calls has been recognized by those cases finding calls by creditors to be tortious
invasions. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, to the extent that
telephone solicitation is made by automatic random dialing of telephone numbers, the mailing list
compilation issues do not arise.
97. Prosser, supra note 53, at 392-98.
98. Restatement Draft, supra note 55, § 652D, Comment c; Prosser, supra note 53, at 394
99. Restatement Draft, supra note 55, § 652D, Comment b; Prosser, supra note 53, at 393.
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sibilities."'100 The public disclosure tort is usually connected with the
disclosure of personal information in the mass media. It is arguable,
however, that the rental of mailing lists falls within this category
because it discloses information about the list members either
explicitly, as in the case of their actual addresses, or implicitly, as in
the case of specifying the characteristics of the group as a whole, for
example, American Express cardholders. Each element of the public
disclosure action will be considered in terms of direct mail practices.
a. Publicity
With direct mail advertising the question is whether by renting or
selling a list of names a list owner is giving publicity to personal data
contained in the list. Publicity, as defined in the Restatement, means
that "the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."'' The
Restatement, however, further notes that "to communicate a fact
concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person, or even to a
small group of persons"' 0 2 does not create publicity.' 0 3
Two factors that might be considered in determining whether the
rental of a mailing list constitutes publicity are the number of times the
list was rented and the resultant availability of the list to the general
public. Publication of the list would undoubtedly constitute publicity
while rental of the list to only one or two mailers probably would
not. 10 4 It is arguable whether rental of a list ever constitutes publicity.
An individual's name on a list is not being publicized in the normal
sense because the user of the list is not concerned with the individual's
name and characteristics, but rather with those of the list as a whole.
Consequently, the publicity is, in many respects, more technical than
real, since the address is simply being affixed to envelopes and the
mailer is not aware of any specific person on the list. At the same time,
it should be noted that the question of publicity is avoided entirely if
the list owner actually does the mailing, because the lessee never has
possession of the names and thus, by definition, there is no disclosure.
100. Prosser, supra note 53, at 396 (footnote omitted); accord, Restatement Draft, supra note
55, § 652D, comment d.
101. Restatement Draft, supra note 55, § 652D, Comment b.
102. Id.
103. One court has held, however, that when creditors call a customer's relatives concerning
the customer's debts, the creditors' conduct is the equivalent of publication of the debts.
Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 81 N.M. 383, 387, 467 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). But see Vogel v.
W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 132, 327 A.2d 133, 137 (1974). See also Voneye v. Turner, 240
S.W.2d 588, 591 (Ky. 1951).
104. See Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942) (letter
sent to 1,000 persons constituted publicity).
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In determining whether publicity has occurred, courts also consider
the defendant's efforts to limit disclosure. In one case, for example, the
court found no publicity when a credit rating company made reports to
its clients because the company required its clients to keep all reports
confidential. 6'5 Similarly, list rentals would be especially unlikely to
create publicity since a list owner typically salts the list with dummy
names to prevent use by unauthorized persons. 1 6 This salting pro-
vides substantially more protection against multiple republications
than does the credit rating companies' contracts.
b. Private Facts
The second requirement of the public disclosure cause of action is
that the disclosed information must be private. Facts already public
cannot be protected by an invasion of privacy action.10 7 Lamont is an
example of the public nature of information barring a claim for
invasion of privacy; the public access to the motor vehicle registration
records precluded the plaintiff's argument that the information was
somehow private.10 8
c. Offensiveness
The third requirement for establishing an actionable disclosure is
that the information disclosed be offensive and objectionable to the
reasonable man. 10 9 Offensiveness is a question of fact to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. It is interesting to note, however, what courts
have considered objectionable. The Wine Hobby court found the
disclosure of addresses and household status and identification of heads
of households to be an invasion of privacy.110 Although this case
examined privacy in a somewhat different context from that of the
traditional tort, similar disclosures might arguably be found objection-
able in a tort context. In addition, those writers who see privacy as
protecting incorporeal values might view any unauthorized disclosure
of personal information as objectionable.
105. Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 429
F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971). "Only clients of Retail Credit have been
supplied with this information, and while this limited publication may have resulted in the denial
of an insurance policy, or a denial of credit, the court holds that this is not the type of public
disclosure required to establish an invasion of privacy ....... Id. at 423.
106. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
107. Restatement Draft, supra note 55, § 652D, Comment c; Prosser, supra note S3, at
395-96.
108. 269 F. Supp. at 883.
109. The Restatement refers to "unreasonable publicity," but appears to look to the nature of
the matter disclosed rather than the means of disclosure. Restatement Draft, supra note 55,
§ 652D, Comment d.
110. 502 F.2d at 136-37; see notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
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In sum, two generalizations can be made about mailing lists and the
disclosure portion of the privacy tort. First, if mailing lists are com-
piled from public sources, the owner of the list cannot be held liable
for disclosing the already public information to third parties. Second,
disclosure problems can be avoided if the list owner, instead of the
lessee, does the actual mailing, thereby precluding any publicity.
3. Appropriation
The appropriation aspect of the invasion of privacy tort typically
involves the use of an individual's name or likeness by another for
commercial gain, as in advertising endorsements. The Restatement
requires an appropriation of some aspect of an individual's reputation
or social or commercial standing.111 Some cases look to a property
basis for the appropriation cause of action, while others are more
concerned with violations of personal sensibilities. 1 1 2
111. Restatement Draft, supra note 55, § 652C, Comment c. The appropriation action has
been codified in many states. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ.
Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). A restitutionary remedy in which damages are
determined by the profit made by the lessor of the mailing list, rather than the harm caused to
the person listed, is also a possibility. See Teller, Restitution as an Alternative Remedy for a
Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40 (1956); York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 499 (1957).
112. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941),
and Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA, 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957), refused to grant
relief for injuries to feelings, but indicated that the outcome might have been otherwise if the
actions had been based on injury to property rights. In O'Brien, the court found that a college
football player failed to state a claim when he alleged injury to reputation and feelings from a
brewer's use of his photograph to illustrate a calendar. The court noted that the football player
had sought publicity by maintaining a press file of photographs and was precluded from claiming
injury to feelings as a result of distribution of the calendar. 124 F.2d at 170. The majority
opinion, however, in response to the dissent's claim that there would be an action in quantum
meruit based on the property value of the plaintiff's picture as an endorsement, stated that it was
only dismissing the claim based on the emotional injuries sustained. Id. at 170. Similarly, the
Hogan court rejected a privacy claim by a professional golfer who alleged that his feelings were
injured as a result of his being associated with a book of golf tips. While indicating that a cause of
action based on injured feelings might be available for someone not widely known, the court
noted ihat the professional golfer, a celebrity, was actually suing for unfair competition, an
economic tort. In effect, Hogan would seem to envision a "right of publicity" for the golfer to
market his name for commercial benefit. See 114 U.S.P.Q. at 320.
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952), on the other hand, held
that injury to feelings alone would constitute grounds to support an appropriation cause of action.
In Eick, a blind woman alleged she had suffered humiliation and loss of respect after a dog food
company had used her picture in an advertisement indicating that she would be obtaining a
seeing eye dog from the company.
A more recent line of cases has sought to show the existence of two interests within the
appropriation tort: one protecting the property value of names when used for commercial
exploitation; the other protecting injury to feelings when someone outside the public eye Is
unwillingly thrust into the spotlight for another's benefit. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1974); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
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The appropriation issues related to direct mail advertising center
around protecting the property value of the names on the lists; it would
be difficult to argue that an individual's feelings would be injured by
inclusion on a mailing list absent publicity subjecting him to public
exposure. The property value argument would seem to be that list
members create the value of a list by serving as recipients of the
mailings.
Value-creation in the context of mailing lists is unclear. On the one
hand, it could be argued that the mailing list compiler is in fact creating
the property value by compiling a list of names that would be useful to
direct mail marketers. 1 3 On the other hand, one court has held in a
different context that if value is created from use of an individual's
name, it rightfully belongs to the individual. In Canessa v. J.I. Kislak,
Inc.,114 a real estate broker found a house for a veteran with a large
family. The broker then used a newspaper article describing the
broker's efforts on the veteran's behalf in its advertising and included a
photograph of the veteran's family. The veteran and his family sued,
alleging that the use of the article for advertising purposes constituted
an unauthorized appropriation. The court found that the veteran had
an actionable claim and reasoned that the value of the plaintiffs' names
as a form of advertising endorsement resided with the plaintiffs, even
though it was the defendant who had created the value."; Conse-
quently, even though the veteran had no special drawing power, as
would be the case with a celebrity, the name itself was a sufficiently
important component of the implied endorsement's value. 1 16
Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 488-91 (3rd Cir. 1956); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879-0
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
113. Such a view is expressed by Professor Miller- "In contewts such as the sale of personal
information by.. . mailing-list organizations, it is not the subject of the data but a third party
who created the commercially valuable record. Thus, recognition of a property right in the data
subject cannot be justified by arguing that the law merely is acknowledging the economic realities
of the marketplace and protecting his ownership of a valuable item." Assault on Privacy, supra
note 1, at 213.
114. 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (Law Div. 1967).
115. "[Plaintiffs' names and likenesses belong to them. As such they are property. They are
things of value. Defendant has made them so, for it has taken them for its own commercial
benefit." Id. at 351, 235 A.2d at 76.
116. The court left open, however, the extent of damages and whether recovery would be in
restitution or for injury to feelings. Id. at 352 n.5, 235 A.2d at 76 n.S. Several courts have placed
some significance on the underlying value of endorsements. A person making an endorsement can
be seen as cashing in on a reputation built up over time, and often, in the case of a sports star or
actor, after extensive effort. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn.
1970); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. Div. 1967).
In Canessa, it could be argued that the veteran's reputation was the product of his labors as a
veteran and father of eight children. Also, with an endorsement, the endorser often loses
something because- he weakens his future credibility and, hence, future marketability. Treece,




Although a mailing list member might argue on the basis of Canessa
that his name was of independent value even after being marketed as
part of a list, Canessa is distinguishable from the direct mail situation
since it involved an implied endorsement by the plaintiffs. In addition,
absent a publication of the list, it is difficult to see how the direct mail
list member would suffer any detriment from the endorsement.
Canessa is also distinguishable from the direct mail situation in that
the veteran did not save any costs on his house by being in the broker's
advertisement, whereas mail order buyers can directly benefit by way
of the lower prices resulting from the absence of retail inter-
mediaries. 117
The appropriation portion of the invasion of privacy tort has uncer-
tain applicability to direct mail lists. Most courts seem to view the
appropriation action as protecting the pecuniary value of the name or
personality and it is unclear whether use of a name outside an
endorsement context has such value. At the same time, use of a name
on a direct mail list would seem not to involve the publicity associated
with many of the endorsement actions.
Thus, the invasion of privacy torts generally have uncertain
applicability to direct mail since they seem primarily concerned with
the types of wrongs that gave birth to them: intrusion, publication of
private information, and unauthorized endorsements. The questiona-
ble adaptability of common law privacy remedies to contemporary
privacy concerns has indeed been noted as a general problem relating
to the rise of the computer. 118 It is therefore instructive to examine the
response of the direct mail industry and Congress to such concerns.
IV. RESPONSES TO DIRECT MAIL PRIVACY CONCERNS
A. The Industry's Response
The direct mail industry's response to the privacy controversy has
been largely one of offering to remove from its mailing lists the names
of those persons who so request. The industry association, the Direct
Mail Marketing Association, has established a "Mail Preference Service"
through which it distributes to its member organizations the names of
persons asking to be removed from mailing lists. The number of names
removed from lists in this manner has been minimal, averaging only
three or four per 10,000 names. 119 American Express notified its
117. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
118. "Unfortunately, the existing tort remedies seem geared to the activities of private mass
communications media. The existing common-law structure therefore does not appear readily
transferable to regulate the use of personal information by computer networks whose privacy-
invading activities are far more subtle than those that traditionally have confronted the courts."
Information-Oriented Society, supra note 1, at 1180.
119. HEW Report, supra note 1, at 291.
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cardholders that they could have their names removed from the lists to
be rented, but only one percent accepted the offer. 12 0 On the other
hand, sixteen percent of the subscribers to Ms. magazine accepted a
similar offer.12 1
The industry's response, although restricting certain disclosures on
behalf of those persons asking not to have their names rented, does not
address all of the privacy issues raised with respect to direct mail. In
particular, it does not preclude compilation of dossier-type information
from governmental records.
B. The Congressional Response
Congress has considered a number of bills relating to privacy issues,
some of which have involved proposals respecting direct mail lists.12 2
The Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act)123 is perhaps the most com-
prehensive privacy legislation yet adopted by Congress, and, in part,
addresses the privacy issues surrounding direct mail lists.
The Privacy Act's mailing list provisions pertain to federally com-
piled information. The Act prohibits federal agencies from renting or
selling mailing lists unless expressly permitted by law.' 2 4 Underlying
the provisions is the policy that people should have control over
information about themselves.12 5 Thus, the use of information col-
lected by the government should be limited to the government agency
that collects the information. In addition, the committee report saw
many government mailing lists as resulting from at least implied
compulsion to provide information.12 6
The Act obviates the issues raised in the FOIA cases.' 27 The Wine
Hobby information, for example, would be restricted to the use of the
Internal Revenue Service in enforcing taxes on alcoholic beverages and
could not be rented for commercial mailings. 128
Although the committee version of the act would have required
120. Wall St. J., March 13, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., H.R 1984, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); S. 3116, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
New York State has recently amended the New York Public Service Law to prohibit utilities
from selling lists of customers names. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 114 (amending N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law
§ 65) (McKinney 1955).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
124. The Act provides: "An individual's name and address may not be sold or rented by an
agency unless such action is specifically authorized by law. This provision shall not be construed
to require the withholding of names and addresses otherwise permitted to be made public."
Id. § 552a(n).
125. S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad
News 6916, 6946.
126. Id. at 78, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6992.
127. See pt. M(B)(2) supra.
128. See notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text.
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private organizations engaged in interstate commerce to delete names
from mailing lists upon written request, 129 the provision was subse-
quently deleted. The Act, however, did create the Privacy Protection
Study Commission (Commission) to study such a proposal and, in
general, to examine the individual's privacy rights in the private
s6ctor. 130 The Commission released its report on July 12, 1977.
C. The Privacy Protection Study Commission
Although never explicitly stated as such, the Commission appears to
focus on two related dangers underlying contemporary recordkeeping
practices. First, organizations increasingly make decisions concerning
individuals based on information in records. The Commission pointed
to decisions made by organizations issuing insurance policies, granting
credit, and providing employment and social services. 13 1 Second, the
increasing accumulation of information about individuals could lead to
an increased capability for governmental control. 132
The Commission advocated "three concurrent objectives" relating to
records and privacy: (1) to minimize the information required to be
divulged by individuals; (2) to permit individuals to have access to
records about them for purposes of correction and review; and (3) to
set standards concerning the uses and disclosures of information con-
tained in records.133 Throughout its report, however, the Commission
also emphasized the importance of balancing asserted privacy interests
with other societal interests.' 3 4
In response to the congressional directive contained in the Privacy
Act, the Commission's report contained an entire chapter concerning the
privacy issues related to direct mail lists. In making its recommenda-
tions, the Commission placed substantial weight on a number of
characteristics of direct mail. First, it noted that direct mail advertisers
have strong economic incentives for not mailing to persons not wishing
to receive advertising mail and that the direct mail industry has
demonstrated a willingness to develop means by which persons can
inform direct mail advertisers if they desire not to receive such mail. 135
Second, the Privacy Commission identified several societal benefits of
direct mail: its importance as a marketing tool for small businesses; its
129. S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 78, reprinted in (1974] U.S. Cqde Cong. & Ad.
News 6916, 6992.
130. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
131. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 4-5.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 14-15.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Id. at 141-42.
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importance to fund raising by charities; its importance to political fund
raising (especially in light of the new federal election laws); 136 and the
economic importance of direct mail advertising generally.' 37
The Commission reported that it did not "believe that the mere
receipt of mail is the problem."'1 38 The Commission specifically rec-
ommended that legislation should not be enacted to require removal of
an individual's name and address from a mailing list upon his re-
quest. 139 Second, the Commission recommended that those organiza-
tions renting mailing lists notify their members of their rental practices
and provide them with the opportunity to have their names removed
from the lists when rented.140 The Commission also recommended that
state agencies which maintain mailing lists, such as lists of motor
vehicle licensees, permit individuals to indicate in a manner sufficient
to notify those renting such lists whether they want to receive mail.141
The second recommendation appears overbroad, in particular as
extended by the Commission to organizations using house lists.142 In
part, the Commission seemed concerned that an affiliate's use of a
parent's list might somehow constitute a use of the list which was not
originally intended.143 The Commission's logic with respect to the use
of affiliate's mailing lists is unclear. It cited two examples in arguing
that affiliates should not be permitted to exchange lists without meet-
ing notice requirements. First, the Commission discussed two affiliated
companies, one extending credit and the other selling insurance, and
stated that "information about customers" should not be freely ex-
changed between them. It then stated that, similarly, a retailing
affiliate should not rent or lend mailing lists to an affiliate marketing
insurance. 144 The Commission's analogy, however, does not follow,
since the two examples are markedly different iM terms of the informa-
tion subject to exchange and disclosures resulting from such ex-
changes.
In the first example, unlike the second example there is an important
privacy interest in danger. An individual disclosing information for
136. Id. at 134.
137. Id. at 147-48.
138. Id. at 153-54.
139. Id. at 147.
140. Id. at 148.
141. Id. at 153.
142. Id. at 152.
143. "[Ihe Commission believes that regardless of the level at which an organization is
defined as a unit for the purpose of complying with the Commission's several sets of recommenda-
tions, an individual must be assured that information about him collected and maintained in





insurance purposes might not want such information disclosed to a
credit-granting affiliate. For instance, health deficiencies which might
be disclosed to the insurance affiliate arguably should not play a role in
the credit-granting affiliate's decisions. The two affiliates' relevant
personnel would, almost by definition, be separate, so there would
necessarily be disclosure of the sensitive information to additional
people.
On the other hand, the exchange of mailing lists by affiliates
engaged in marketing different products endangers no privacy inter-
ests, especially when the affiliates use common mailing facilities. An
individual customer of the retailing affiliate would suffer no loss of
privacy as a result of the insurance affiliate's mailing. If the same
employees and mailing facilities are used by the affiliates, information
about the individual would not be disclosed to any additional persons
as a result of the mailing. Even if there were a disclosure of informa-
tion to additional persons, there would be no especially sensitive
information involved. 145 Thus, there would be no privacy violations
even if the two affiliates were technically organized as separate sub-
sidiaries or affiliates.
Restrictions on the use of house lists by affiliated organizations
would impede the entrance of competitors into new markets through
mailings made to existing house lists. For instance, in the second
example cited by the Commission, if the retailer were considering
entering the direct mail insurance market and sought to establish an
affiliate to compete in that market (perhaps to comply with state
insurance regulations), its most important asset in entering such mar-
ket might well be its current house list. Requiring the retailer to
comply with an extensive notification procedure before mailing the
insurance affiliate's advertisements to such customers could easily
block the retailer's entry into the insurance market. The Commission's
restrictions on the use of house lists by affiliates would be particularly
onerous for those small organizations having limited access to other
means of advertising or without sufficient funds to rent outside mailing
lists. Similarly burdensome restrictions on competition are even more
apparent in the instances of a magazine publisher forming an affiliate
to market books by mail or a book club forming a record club affiliate.
In the political sector, it would be equally burdensome to require
compliance with the Commission's notification procedures in order for
a committee of a state political party engaged in fundraising for
145. The insurance affiliate's mailing to the members of the retailing affiliate's mailing list is
completely distinguishable from the insurance affiliate's disclosing to the retailing affiliate
information contained on insurance applications. This latter type of disclosure would be subject
to the restrictions on disclosure contained in other sections of the Privacy Commission Report. Id.
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legislative candidates to use a mailing list maintained by its affiliate
committee engaged in fundraising for a gubernatorial candidate.' 4 6
Many of the Commission's other apprehensions relating to the
accumulation of information on mailing lists would appear to have
been more appropriately treated with its recommendations for more
sensitive record systems, such as those relating to credit bureaus,
depository organizations, insurance companies, and medical care in-
stitutions. 147 If the sensitive information collected by these systems
were more closely guarded, direct mail privacy problems would be
minimized. To the extent that such recommendations were adopted,
many of the Commission's concerns about the accumulation and
misuse of intrinsically confidential information through the rental of
mailing lists would be alleviated without jeopardizing the societal
benefits afforded by direct mail advertising.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECT MAIL LEGISLATION
Because direct mail advertising, is an important medium of com-
munication, it is important to consider the constitutional constraints on
legislative proposals for regulating the rental of mailing lists. Several
Supreme Court decisions have examined individuals' constitutional
rights to receive or not to receive mail. In Lamont v. Postmaster
General,14 8 the Court held that an addressee had a first amendment
right to receive mail without affirmatively requesting that such mail be
delivered. The Court invalidated a statute that required addressees of
certain foreign political propaganda to make a written request that the
Post Office deliver such material. 14 9 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan viewed the right to receive publications as a fundamental
right protected by the first amendment,1 50 and rejected the argument
that the statute protected addressees from receiving "often offensive"
material from foreign governments. 151 Justice Brennan noted that
under the statute an addressee's failure to request receipt of a particu-
lar publication resulted in similar publications being retained by the
Post Office, so that the statute "impede[d] delivery even to a willing
addressee." 15 2 He concluded that "[in] the area of First Amendment
146. The required application of the Commission's restrictions in these latter examples would
also have tenuous validity under the first amendment. See note 148 infr and accompanying text.
147. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 85-87, 113, 215-17, 304-16; see, e.g., The
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1100, 92 Stat. 3697.
148. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
149. Id. at 305.
150. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., concurring).
152. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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freedoms, government has the duty to confine itself to the least
intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purpose.' 1 53
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,15 4 the Supreme
Court upheld a statute permitting a person to require that a mailer
stop all future mailings. The statute required the Postmaster General,
upon receipt of a notice from an addressee stating that he had received
pandering materials, to issue an order directing the mailer to refrain
from future mailings to the addressee. 1;' The Court noted that under
the statute a mailer's right to send mail was limited only by an
addressee's affirmative request not to receive mail, and held that the
privacy interest against intrusion protected by the statute sufficiently
outweighed the first amendment rights of the mailer so as to preserve
the statute's constitutionality. 156
After Lamont and Rowan, the first amendment may be interpreted
as precluding legislation requiring direct mail advertisers to mail only
to persons affirmatively requesting receipt of such mail, but not as
precluding legislation prohibiting direct mail advertisers from mailing
to persons specifically requesting that they not receive such mail. t1"
153. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
154. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
155. Id. at 730.
156. "Weighing the highly important right to communicate, but without trying to determine
where it fits into constitutional imperatives, against the very basic right to be free from sights,
sounds, and tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that a mailer's right to communicate
must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee." Id. at 736-37.
157. United States v. Treatman, 408 F. Supp. 944 (C.D. Cal. 1976), supports this formula-
tion of the first amendment's requirements. The Treatmgn court held unconstitutional portions of
a statute that permitted, under certain circumstances, the issuance of an injunction prohibiting
the mailer from mailing any sexually oriented advertisement to any specified addressee, group of
addressees, or all persons. Id. at 953. The court held that the statute violated the first amendment
to the extent that it permitted an injunction to be issued against mailings to all persons. In
distinguishing Rowan, the court noted that in this case the statute permitted an injunction against
mailing to persons other than those specifically requesting not to receive the mail. The court then
held that under Lamont, absent a specific request not to receive specified mailings, an injunction
could not be issued against mailing to persons who had not specifically requested not to receive
such mail. Id. at 954.
In Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 489 P.2d 809, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042 (1972), the California Supreme Court similarly
limited Rowan's holding to instances where individuals had affirmatively requested not to receive
materials. The court ruled unconstitutional an "anti-littering" ordinance that prohibited the
circulation or delivery of any materials without having first obtained permission from the
property owner, resident, or occupant. Id. at 819-20, 489 P.2d at 810-11, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
The court rejected the city's argument that the ordinance was constitutional as a protection of
individual privacy. The court noted that the ordinance went beyond what would be required to
protect "unwilling listeners" since it could have been more narrowly drawn to preclude distribu-
tions only to persons expressing objections. Instead, the ordinance also impeded distributions to
persons not raising objections. Id. at 826, 489 P.2d at 814, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 782. The court
concluded that "a proper accommodation of the competing First Amendment and .privacy values
at issue requires that the initial burden be placed on the homeowner to express his objection to
the distribution of material." Id. at 826, 489 P.2d at 814-15, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83.
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The Court's decision in Cohen v. Californial 8 sheds further light on
this delicate question. There, the Court noted that in some circum-
stances the intrusion into the home of "unwelcome views and ideas
which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue"'1 9 may be
prohibited. The Court implied that the right to foreclose communica-
tion of views and ideas is strictly limited:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence
dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.' 6 0
Under Cohen, given the indispensability of direct mail advertising to
the communication of various types of expression, it is questionable
whether, at least when obscenity is not involved, direct mail advertis-
ing can be viewed as such an intolerable invasion of privacy so as to be
prohibited.
These decisions cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Commis-
sion's recommendations if enacted as legislation. Requiring a list owner
affirmatively to notify its list members of the owner's mailing and
rental practices arguably might result in too great an "initial burden"
being placed on the list owner. The result could be a severe impair-
ment of free dissemination of thought through the mails. 16' This
requirement would be especially onerous to those list owners not
having regular means, such as monthly bills, for communicating with
their list members.
The constitutionality of the Commission's recommendation that
mailers notify their list members of their mailing practices before
exchanging lists with affiliated organizations would be especially ques-
tionable. As applied to affiliated mailers, the recommendation would
impair dissemination without producing any corresponding protection
of privacy.162 It should be noted that the Commission was primarily
concerned with the potential abuse of mailing lists in compiling
dossier-type information, as explicitly contrasted to the receipt of
mail. 163 The application of the recommendation to affiliated mailers
would result in no increased protection of privacy as it would not bar
any additional persons from access to the mailing lists. Free expres-
158. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket bearing an obscenity
directed at the draft. The Court held that "absent a... particularized and compelling reason.,.
[a] State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple
public display . . . of [a] single four-letter expletive a criminal offense." Id. at 26.
159. Id. at 21.
160. Id.
161. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. at 308.
162. See notes 135-45 supra and accompanying text.
163. Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 149-50.
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sion, however, would be substantially impaired as advertisers would
be inhibited in mailing to those on their affiliates' lists. Because the
Commission could effectively guard against abusive dossier compila-
tions of mailing lists by limiting the application of its recommendation
to unaffiliated mailers, the extension to affiliates would be unnecessary
and subject to constitutional attack as an overrestrictive abridgment of
free expression.1 64
The Commission considered the implication of first amendment issues
only in terms of their general application to its own recommendations.
As viewed in the context of direct mail advertising, the Commission's
analysis is at best unconvincing. The Commission pointed to Rowan165
as establishing that "it is not unconstitutional to give an individual
standing to assert his own interest in the flow of communication
between private parties."'1 66 Relying on Rowan, the Commission also
recommended that an individual be given an opportunity to participate
in any change that would materially affect his legitimate expectation
of confidentiality. 167 The Commission misread Rowan. At most,
Rowan can be seen as establishing privacy as a counterweight to first
amendment considerations. Rowan involved the right of an individual
to remove himself from those persons receiving mail from a specified
mailer of pandering materials; it cannot be viewed as establishing any
doctrine with respect to the balancing of first amendment and privacy
considerations in communications between third parties. In light of
Lamont, Rowan cannot be viewed as supporting the constitutionality
of a provision that would require prior action on the part of direct mail
advertisers before list members could receive mail.
After a cursory analysis, the Commission concluded that the recent
Supreme Court "commercial speech" cases also would not create any
obstacles to the implementation of its general recommendations, noting
that the cases "almost exclusively concern advertising. 11 68 Regardless
164. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). "[E]ven though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose." Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
165. Actually, the Privacy Commission Report cites Lamont, but discusses the facts of Rowan.
In the context of the Privacy Commission Report, it seems clear that Rowan was the case
intended for citation. See Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 23.
166. Id. at 23.
167. Id. at 24.
168. Id. Specifically, the Privacy Commission Report discusses Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) and Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The Privacy Commission's
analysis of recent developments respecting commercial speech is curious, since it cites Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy as having "swept away" the prior exclusion of commercial speech from
first amendment protection and then cites Pittsburgh Press, an earlier case, as establishing that
"commercial speech remains doctrinally outside the mainstream of the First Amendment In some
ways." Privacy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 23. In any event, cases decided subsequent
[Vol. 4 7
DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING
of its relevance to the Commission's other recommendations, the
extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech is clearly
applicable to those recommendations respecting mailing lists. Of par-
ticular relevance to the protection of direct mail as an advertising
medium is Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 169 in which the Su-
preme Court rejected an argument that an ordinance did not violate
the first amendment because it restricted only one advertising medium,
that is, "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in front of a house.170 Similarly,
regulation of direct mail advertising, even though affecting only one
medium, would raise first amendment concerns as there is no adequate,
alternative medium for many advertisers, often for the same reasons as
listed in Linmark.171
VI. PRIVACY AND MAILING LIST SOURCES: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS
In considering the privacy issues raised by direct mail advertising
and the proper policy and legal responses to them, it is essential to
distinguish among the three types of mailing lists. Each type raises
different issues and provides different societal benefits.
A. House Lists
House lists raise few privacy issues. The information embodied in
the names and addresses is used for the purpose for which it was
originally provided, that is, the list member's purchase of the list
owner's product. Intrusion problems are unlikely. A relatively large
number of a house list's members are presumably interested in receiv-
ing such mail as news of sales, since each list member is already a
customer of the list owner. The list owner also has the business
incentive to save costs by deleting uninterested, nonbuying customers.
Similarly, the list owner is unlikely to send objectionable mail to those
on his house list for fear of antagonizing his regular customers.
Problems of public disclosure of private facts are not present since
there is no disclosure; the entire transaction takes place between the
list owner and the list member. Abusive dossier compilations are also
to the preparation of the Privacy Commission Report cast substantial doubt on the extent to
which commercial speech may be limited. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
169. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
170. The Court noted that alternative media were inadequate. Newspaper advertising or
listing with real estate agents is generally more costly, less likely to reach persons not deliberately
seeking sales information, and less effective in communicating the message conveyed by a "For
Sale" sign. Id. at 93.
171. One commentator has proposed that direct mail advertisers be required to obtain the
consent of an individual before placing his name on a mailing list. List Sales, supra note 87, at
612. He defends his proposal as a permissable regulation of commercial speech in terms of time,
place,' and manner. Id. Linmark, however, decided after the commentary, raises serious
questions about this proposal given the uniqueness of direct mail as a communication medium.
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unlikely because the only dossier-type information that can be com-
piled is that of the list member's purchases from the list owner. Few
additional privacy problems would be raised by affiliated organizations
using each others' house lists, provided the mailings were performed
by a single operational unit. 1
72
Although mailings to house list members raise few privacy issues,
under the Linmark analysis, the house list is an indispensable advertis-
ing medium for many enterprises that would be unable to afford
alternative media such as radio or television, whether for raising
contributions or selling products. House lists also are an important,
inexpensive source of potential customers for list owners entering new
markets, whether directly or through their affiliates, and, therefore,
have a positive affect on competition. Given both the absence of
privacy concerns and the substantial societal benefits arising from the
unfettered use of house lists, their regulation on privacy grounds would
be unsound from both a constitutional and a public policy perspective.
B. Direct Response Lists
The rental of other list owners' house lists involves a somewhat
different privacy evaluation, since the relationship between advertiser
and list member is more attenuated than it is with house lists. As with
house lists, the information embodied in the names and addresses is
used for the purpose for which it was provided-a purchase by the list
member-except not from the original seller. Here again the list owner
has business incentives to prevent intrusion problems. To avoid an-
tagonizing its own customers, a list owner typically monitors the
material to be mailed and inserts dummy names to guard against
misuse. Unlike house lists, however, direct response lists do raise
disclosure concerns, since names and addresses are disclosed, as well
as such implicit information as is indicated by the description of the
list. Although frequent rentals of a list might raise publicity issues, 173 a
more important concern is that the rentals increase the chances of the
list being abused in the creation of dossier-type information. The
placement of dummy names in the list, while protecting against
unauthorized mailings, would not protect against such abuse as dossier
compilation. Nevertheless, the disclosure and compilation problems
with direct response lists would be largely avoided if the list owner
mails the material, so that only those names actually responding to the
mailing would be disclosed to the lessee.
On the other hand, rental of mailing lists provides important societal
benefits. The existence of lists can lessen the cost of entry into new
markets by increasing the sources of targeted mail order audiences to
which new competitors can advertise efficiently and without large
172. See notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text.
173. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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investment. In fact, there may be no alternative media available for
those wishing to communicate to a narrowly defined group of people,
whether potential customers or political or charitable contributors.
To be effective, any regulation of list rentals must strike the proper
balance between the privacy concerns and the societal benefits. Disclo-
sure of particularly sensitive information, such as bank, insurance, or
medical records, could be easily controlled by regulations directed to
the specific type of information, similar to the recommendations ad-
vanced by the Privacy Commission respecting these types of records.
Such regulation would not greatly impede free communication via
direct mail, but would protect legitimate privacy interests. Similarly,
allowing individuals to request deletion of their names from direct
response lists would enable those concerned about the compilation
issues to avoid having their names disclosed, yet maintain the econom-
ical availability of lists. It is important to note that there are business
incentives for the list owner to make requested deletions: the list owner
avoids antagonizing its own customers who do not want to receive
mail from others, and the list may command a higher rental price as it
contains fewer nonbuying members.
However, requiring the list owner affirmatively to seek out those list
members willing to be included on a rental list would be dysfunctional.
The list owner's costs of maintaining a list suitable for rental could
increase to the point of making list rental too expensive, thereby
impairing the societal benefits afforded by list rentals generally. Such a
requirement also would be of doubtful constitutionality under Lamont
and Linmark17 4 since it would in effect impede dissemination of
information absent an affirmative request by an individual wishing to
receive it, and would foreclose an indispensable medium for many
types of communication.
C. Compiled Lists
Compiled lists raise substantially greater privacy problems than do
house lists or direct response lists. The purpose for which the name
and address of a compiled list member is originally given, for example,
registering a car, is generally dissimilar from that of purchasing a list
owner's products. In addition, compiled list owners do not have the
same business incentives for guarding against intrusion as do list
owners using or renting lists of their own customers. Compiled lists
also raise greater disclosure questions. By definition, compiled lists are
compilations of otherwise publicly available data that when combined
may be seen as forming the basis for dossier-type information about
the list members. Although arguably the information about the list
members is already public, when a number of such different pieces of
public information are aggregated into a single mailing list, it might be
174. See notes 148-53, 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
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said that a new type of information about the individuals on the list
results. The dossier-creation dangers, however, do not result from the
rental of a compiled list or a mailing to its members; the dangers result
directly from the compilations themselves, regardless of whether the
lists created are later used for direct mail advertising.
Compiled lists, however, provide substantial societal benefits similar
to those of direct response lists. In particular, compiled lists may be a
uniquely important medium of communication. For instance, a person
wishing to promote water conservation legislation might find it indis-
pensable to write to all of a state's licensed fishermen; to convey the
same message via broadcast or newspapers might prove substantially
more expensive.
Because the real privacy issue raised by compiled lists relates to their
actual compilation, and not their rental, privacy interests may most
easily be protected by limiting the original disclosure of information to
the compiler. As with direct response lists, list compilers could be
precluded from obtaining specific types of particularly sensitive infor-
mation, such as that relating to medical, insurance, or banking rec-
ords. 175 In contrast to direct response lists, however, permitting
individuals to have their names deleted from compiled lists upon their
request to the list owner is not likely to be an effective means of
protecting privacy. Compiled list owners are much less likely to
communicate directly with their list members than are other list
owners, so that few people would be aware of which compiled lists
contained their names. At the same time, requiring notification of list
members of a list compiler's practices would clearly be an additional,
substantial cost for the compiler and also of doubtful constitutionality
under Lamont.
Those persons wishing to keep their names off compiled lists could
easily be accommodated by the government agencies that originally
obtained the names and addresses. For instance, a state motor vehicle
department could omit from the names disclosed to list compilers those
persons so requesting. Such an accommodation would avoid any
potential Lamont problems, since, as in Rowan, communication would
be impeded only by the prior affirmative request of the potential
addressee. Thus, the privacy interests of individuals concerned about
compilations would be protected, and the wishes of those who want to
receive direct mail advertising would be respected.
In conclusion, to understand clearly the privacy issues relating to
direct mail advertising, it is necessary to differentiate among the three
types of mailing lists. Only by evaluating both the privacy problems
raised and the societal benefits afforded by each type of mailing list is
it possible to formulate effective legal and policy responses to direct
mail advertising and privacy issues.
175. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
